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There have been three different kinds of reactions to the coronavirus  crisis: 
those from early movers, with extensive measures taken (Israel, Jordan, 
Gulf countries, Morocco); those from states that initially struggled to ac-
knowledge the magnitude of the crisis out of concern about its economic im-
pact (Iran, Turkey, Egypt); and, those from countries whose ability to react 
to the crisis is in doubt because of civil war and internal disarray (Yemen, 
Libya, Syria).
 • The capacities of regional health systems are lagging in comparison to interna-
tional peers. The median age of the population is relatively low. However the 
number of vulnerable elderly is still substantial, as the region has been under-
going a demographic transition for several decades now. Other at-risk groups 
are the poor, labour migrants, the prison population, refugees, and internally 
displaced persons.
 • The economic impact of COVID-19 will affect domestic spending and threatens 
to undermine the social contract and political stability. The pandemic also has 
the potential to shake up geopolitical dynamics, as it will reduce the ability of 
key actors to intervene regionally (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia).
 • The coronavirus crisis requires government intervention on a large scale. Such 
intervention will be used to further the political goals of authoritarian regimes, 
too. It will be integrated into their repression strategies – including cyber 
surveillance – and will likely outlast the health crisis itself. The pandemic is 
thus reinforcing trends towards populism and authoritarian restoration in the 
 Middle East and North Africa.
Policy Implications
The European Union is currently preoccupied with its own coronavirus crisis, 
and struggling to find coordinated approaches to the tackling of it. Yet it should 
not overlook the unfolding socio-economic crisis in its southern neighbourhood. 
If Europe wants to be a serious geopolitical actor, it needs to find the where-
withal to provide assistance – and advertise that fact – to match similar efforts 
undertaken by China as part of its “mask diplomacy” in the region.
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The Spread of COVID-19: Questionable Statistics
The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region was catapulted into the spotlight 
regarding the coronavirus crisis when Iran registered its first case on 19 Febru-
ary, and developed into the second-gravest centre of the pandemic after China at 
that time. The magnitude of the problem was illustrated by the large number of 
high-ranking officials who contracted the disease: among them was deputy health 
 minister Iraj Harirchi, who was in charge of Iran’s COVID-19 task force.
Most other MENA countries reported their first cases in the second half of 
February through 2 March. Relative latecomers were Turkey (11 March), Sudan 
(13 March), Syria (22 March), Libya (24 March), and Yemen (10 April). By that 
time Europe and then the united States had developed into the main hotspots of 
the pandemic; the MENA numbers of cases and deaths are high as well however, 
with them dramatically rising in some countries and likely underreported for lack 
of testing facilities.
As of 20 April, Turkey (86,306), Iran (82,211), and Israel (13,491) had regis-
tered the largest number of cases in the MENA region, accounting for the lion’s 
share of a total of 220,980 according to Johns Hopkins university. However, the ac-
curacy of these statistics is a concern. Even highly developed countries have strug-
gled to implement mass testing, and not all COVID-19 death cases might be accu-
rately accounted for. A recent study by the university of Göttingen argues that the 
average COVID-19 case-detection rate might be as low as 6 per cent (Bommer and 
Vollmer 2020). In Europe, the COVID-19 death rate from officially recorded cases 
hovers between 3.2 per cent in Germany and 13.2 per cent in Italy. In the MENA 
death rates differ widely too, from below 1 per cent in the smaller Gulf countries to 
14.3 per cent in Algeria, leading to a regional average of 3.8 per cent.
Turkey was one of the last countries to report its first case in the MENA, and 
has now one of the steepest growth trajectories in that regard globally. Egypt was 
an early reporter of the first case (14 February), but had only 3,144 as of 20 April. 
 Despite relatively low official numbers, the German Robert Koch Institute classified 
it a high-risk area on 21 March amid doubts about those official statistics. Low num-
bers might reflect a lack of testing facilities, rather than reality. Some governments 
such as those of Turkey, Egypt, and Algeria have also shown the political will to sup-
press bad news and censor whistle-blowers. It is striking that the MENA countries 
with the lowest numbers of cases are the ones poorest and with the least resilient 
health systems, often ravished by civil war. As of 20 April, Sudan had  reported 
92 cases, Libya 51, Syria 19, and Yemen only 1 – hardly credible, as the World 
Health Organization warned of a pending “explosion” of cases in the latter country. 
Most MENA countries had started to implement travel restrictions from China 
by the end of January, which were extended to other world regions over the follow-
ing month up until mid- March – when air travel completely ground to a halt. Syria 
and Lebanon had maintained air travel to and from Iran longer than others out of 
political expediency, which gave rise to claims of negligence. By the second half 
of March, most countries had closed schools, mosques, churches, and synagogues 
and implemented some sort of lockdown regime with different degrees of scope 
and enforcement. Israel, Jordan, Gulf countries, and Morocco were early movers, 
with relatively extensive measures taken; Iran, Turkey, and Egypt initially failed 
to acknowledge the magnitude of the crisis, and cracked down on whistle-blowers 
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given concerns about the outbreak’s economic impact. In Libya, Yemen, and Syria 
meanwhile the ability to react to the crisis is in doubt because of civil war and internal 
disarray, while anecdotal evidence suggests that curfews are only partially observed.
State Capacity, the Health System, and Vulnerabilities
State capacity to implement COVID-19 countermeasures in the MENA has its limi-
tations. This is particularly true for the healthcare sector. It limits the possibili-
ties of the region to cope with the peculiar vulnerabilities of its population, with 
considerable variations between poor, rich, and war-torn countries. Heavy reliance 
on oil rents by some states alongside the limited reliance of others on the regional 
recycling of such rents via strategic transfer payments and investments imply a re-
duced dependence on tax collection. As a result, administrative capacities to rule 
deep into society are underdeveloped. Administrations are top-heavy, there is no 
tradition of municipal autonomy, and discretionary power to make decisions on the 
lower rungs of administrative hierarchies is limited. MENA states are centralised 
but weak. They have limited social control and ability to penetrate and regulate 
society, or to extract resources from it for later appropriation. As “infrastructural 
power” is low, the focus of regime survival shifts to the “despotic power” of repres-
sion instead (Springborg 2020).
Capacities of MENA health systems are lagging in comparison to  international 
peers. Together with African countries, they are at the lower end of the Global 
Health Security Index 2019 that measures the robustness of a health system in 
terms of clinical capacity, protection of health personnel, crisis communication, 
and availability of medical supplies (Stöhr and Stotz 2020). Only Israel, Saudi  Arabia, 
and Turkey manage to score mid-level positions in the 40s (out of 100); Iran, Qatar, 
Kuwait, and Morocco follow with numbers in the 30s, or close to it. The united Arab 
Emirates ranks relatively low for a rich country, with a score of only 22.9. Algeria, 
Sudan, and Egypt score well below 20, while Libya and Yemen mark rock bottom with 
values below 10. This does not compare favourably with the global average of 40.2, 
and an average score of 51.9 among the 60 highest-income countries in the world. 
The limited capacities of the MENA health systems are up against a number of 
vulnerabilities and peculiarities when facing the COVID-19 pandemic. Compared to 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, the 
population in the region is relatively young. The median age of the population is 27, 
as opposed to 42.5 in Europe. There are fewer older people above 65, being those 
particularly vulnerable to succumbing to COVID-19. However the MENA’s median 
age is well above that of the least-developed countries, where it is 20. MENA socie-
ties are not as young as is sometimes assumed. Many of them are well ahead in a 
long-term demographic transition, with birth rates around the replacement ratio of 
2.1 children per woman (e.g. Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Tunisia). Youth bulges already 
peaked in the 1970s in North Africa and in the 1990s in the Middle East. There are 
30 million elderly over 65 among a total population of about 500 million people. 
COVID-19 affects the poor more than the affluent. The former can ill afford to 
shelter in place, blue-collar occupations cannot be conducted from the safety of 
one’s own home, and cramped living quarters can increase the risk of contagion. 
Once the poor have contracted the disease they face further disadvantages, as they 
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have less access to healthcare. COVID-19 will likely affect poorer MENA countries 
with high shares of informal housing and employment more than the affluent ones 
of the region. But even the oil-rich Gulf countries have population pockets that 
are more vulnerable than others, namely labour migrants and people with unclear 
residency status. Qatar has implemented a rigorous quarantine programme in its 
labour camps, while anecdotal evidence suggests that the uAE has started to repat-
riate some of its foreign labour by loosening the flight ban and allowing these people 
out of the country. Mecca, Medina, and Jeddah have large shantytowns that are 
home to descendants of migrants from Africa and Southeast Asia who came to Saudi 
Arabia decades ago and overstayed their visas. They form a permanent underclass 
with limited legal rights. The recent decision of the Saudi government to open the 
healthcare system to everybody for COVID-19 treatment regardless of their legal 
residency status is an implicit acknowledgement of this public health risk. A similar 
concern pertains to the highly vulnerable refugees and internally displaced persons 
in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. 
The Gulf countries and Egypt have among the largest per capita shares world-
wide of people suffering from diabetes and obesity, two groups particularly at risk 
of succumbing to COVID-19. The Gulf countries also have a skewed gender balance 
because of predominantly male labour migration. Women make up only one-quar-
ter of the population in Qatar, 30 per cent thereof in the uAE, and 42 per cent of it 
in Saudi Arabia. As COVID-19 apparently affects men more than women, this could 
make these countries more susceptible to the pandemic. Contagion in cramped 
prisons is another risk factor, particularly in those countries that have seen a steep 
rise in the number of political prisoners interned such as Egypt, Turkey, Syria, and 
Iran. The Iranian government admitted as much when it ordered the temporary 
release of 85,000 prisoners in mid-March in order to curb the spread of the virus. 
The Assad regime in Syria also announced a partial amnesty on 22 March to reduce 
pressure on overcrowded prisons. In both cases political prisoners were largely ex-
cluded from the amnesty, which focused rather on ordinary criminals. 
In Syria, the selective allocation of public goods such as electricity to population 
segments that are supportive of the regime has been observed. Similar spatial selec-
tivity of coronavirus-related healthcare and relief efforts might occur elsewhere in 
the region too, not only in Syria. The insurgent pocket of Idlib, Syria, Kurdish areas 
of Turkey, Arabic-speaking Khuzestan in Iran, Israeli-occupied palestinian territo-
ries, or Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province that has a large Shi’a population might rank 
lower on the priority scales of the respective governments. On the other hand, there 
is reason for cautious optimism. Cooperation between the Israeli and palestinian 
administrations has occurred, while there have been relief efforts and solidarity 
campaigns for the particularly hard-hit Eastern province of Saudi Arabia – where 
returning pilgrims from the Shi‘i shrines in the Iranian city of Qom represented the 
first cases of COVID-19 in the country.
Finally, war has debilitated health systems in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The 
need to cater to the wounded also constitutes an additional burden on already over-
whelmed health systems and further reduces their capacity to react to the  pandemic 
per se. Yemenis are already suffering from severe malnutrition and a cholera epide-
mic, which make them particularly vulnerable in case of COVID-19 infection. Sanc-
tions can have an adverse effect, too. Food and medicine are typically excluded from 
sanctions for humanitarian reasons, but financial sanctions can curtail their import 
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as access to trade finance is impossible and foreign assets are frozen. Currently 
the uS is opposing an Iranian request for a uSD 5 billion credit line from the In-
ternational Monetary Fund to facilitate COVID-19-related relief, which prompted 
Iranian president Rouhani to accuse the uS of “medical terrorism.”
Economic Impact: Oil, Tourism, Food Imports, and Finance
COVID-19 will affect domestic spending, and threatens to undermine the social 
contract and political stability. The pandemic also has the potential to shake up geo-
political dynamics, as it will reduce the ability of key actors to intervene regionally. 
The importance of oil for the MENA’s economies can hardly be overstated. It forms 
a large share of gross domestic product and an overwhelming majority of exports 
as well as of government revenues in many countries of the region. It underpins the 
social contract of rentier states. They redistribute oil rents via public services and 
transfer payments, and expect political acquiescence to their authoritarian ways of 
governing in return. Oil is crucial for the extreme rentiers with very high rents per 
capita (Kuwait, Qatar, uAE), but also for middling rentiers (Bahrain, Libya, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia) and for poor rentiers – whose high rent share results only from their 
economies not producing much else (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Yemen). In semi-rentier 
states like Egypt, Jordan, and Syria the rent endowment per capita is too small to 
enjoy the same distributional discretion as the full rentier states. They only have 
some domestic rents from oil, gas, and potash, but they have been integrated into 
the regional recycling of oil rents via strategic transfer payments from Gulf coun-
tries; they have benefitted from migrant remittances too. 
Oil prices were below the budget break-even prices of most rentier states even 
before COVID-19’s outbreak. Only Kuwait and Qatar were able to (barely) make 
ends meet. The supply shock of the unconventional oil revolution in the uS, de-
mand destruction in the wake of the Great Recession, and concerns about growing 
e-mobility have weighed on the sector (Woertz 2019b). price declines and the ini-
tially failed renewal of the OpEC+ agreement ignited an oil price war between Saudi 
Arabia and Russia over market share on 8 March, right at the onset of the corona-
virus crisis, which can bring demand destruction of up to 20 million barrels per day 
(mbpd) according to the International Energy Agency – unprecedented in scale. 
Faced with events of this magnitude both countries rowed back only a month later 
and reached a truce, agreeing on production cuts of 10 mbpd in May and June of 
2020, to be followed by lower cuts of 8 mbpd for the rest of the year and sustained 
cuts of 6 mbpd from January 2021 to April 2022.
The oil-market rout has far-reaching geopolitical implications. Rentier states 
will struggle to fulfil their social contract and maintain domestic spending. They 
will repatriate foreign assets and need to access international capital markets for 
debt issuance, which will become more difficult and costly to obtain. Iran enjoys 
no such access at all as a result of sanctions. One poorer rentier, Oman, has already 
been downgraded by credit-rating agencies. Ambitious projects of economic diver-
sification in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere are in question (Woertz 2019a). 
The ability to import arms and project force abroad will decline. The  relative 
costs of regional intervention will rise for Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The tem-
porary ceasefire that the Saudi led-coalition announced in Yemen at the end of 
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March 2020, undertaken with the face-saving argument that it would help to pre-
vent a coronavirus outbreak in the country, is a sign that Saudi Arabia is seeking a 
way to extricate itself from this costly foreign policy adventure. The Kingdom was 
also the world’s largest arms importer between 2015 and 2019; it might be forced 
to reduce such purchases, which until now have been an essential aspect of its re-
lationship with a transactional White House. Egypt and others will not be able to 
count as easily on strategic transfer payments from Gulf countries to cover their 
budget deficits. Iran on the other hand will likely bear the higher costs and main-
tain its proxy strategy in countries like Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to safeguard the 
extensive strategic investments it has made in them. However, its ability to provide 
economic aid and create goodwill was never great by any standard and will suffer 
further, possibly creating popular resentment – as already evidenced in the pre-
pandemic protests witnessed in Lebanon and Iraq. 
Lower oil prices will provide some relief to oil importers of the region such as 
Turkey and Lebanon, but this is overshadowed by the financial havoc that the coro-
navirus crisis is wreaking. Both countries have covered their substantial current ac-
count deficits with capital imports for decades. Now they face additional problems 
in continuing this practice, especially Lebanon – which defaulted on its debt for the 
first time on 9 March.
Other sectors will suffer, too. Value chains of North African industries for tex-
tiles and car supply parts are disrupted. Tourism is a major factor in the economies 
of Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan but also of Saudi Arabia, which 
receives each year millions of pilgrims – not to mention of the uAE and its logisti-
cal hub Dubai. Emirates airlines stopped all passenger flights on 25 March, and 
Saudi Arabia will likely cancel this year’s pilgrimage season. The super-carrier and 
transit-hub business model that Gulf airlines have pursued successfully for many 
years is in question. Tourism has all but collapsed as a result of the coronavirus 
crisis, and is unlikely to recover swiftly. Any exit scenario from current lockdown 
measures will be gradual, and attitudes towards international travel will be more 
conservative in the pandemic’s aftermath. 
The MENA is the world’s largest importer of cereals, while also importing 
 copious amounts of meat and dairy products from far away. Affordable food and 
subsidies of food staples  are a key aspect of the social contract in many countries 
of the region. Temporary supply disruptions in the wake of the global food crisis of 
2007/2008 spooked MENA countries. They reacted with increased storage at home, 
and a scramble for privileged bilateral access to food production via investments in 
farmland and – more importantly – companies involved in food trade, processing, 
and distribution (Woertz 2013). The coronavirus crisis has reignited similar fears in 
the relatively urbanised MENA region, where most people rely on markets for daily 
supplies. Globally, food value chains will suffer more than the farming sector, which 
might only face temporary labour shortages. The more  modern and capital-inten-
sive value chains that dominate in developed countries and emerging markets will 
be less affected than the traditional and transitional food value chains that still play 
a major role in most MENA countries (outside the Gulf region, Turkey, and Israel). 
Some MENA governments are able to cushion the pandemic’s economic impact 
with relief aid. Saudi Arabia has decided to pay 60 per cent of the salaries of Saudi 
employees in the private sector for three months. Even a less affluent country like 
Morocco was able to create a solidarity fund of EuR 3 billion, to which the  European 
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union has contributed EuR 150 million (Baade et al. 2020). In the medium term, 
this might not be enough and could have political consequences. 
Will COVID-19 Empower or Unmask Authoritarianism?
The outlined massive economic impact will reduce the fiscal space of MENA regimes 
and their ability to fulfil their bargain within the social contract.  Long-standing so-
cio-economic grievances will be aggravated. Once the dust settles, recent  dynamics 
of protest movements and regime-survival strategies will likely be accentuated – 
including increased recourse to repression. The MENA largely escaped the third 
wave of global democratisation that lasted from the 1970s to the 1990s. With the 
exception of Tunisia, the Arab Spring did not break this trend. Spring has turned 
into winter, and authoritarian backlash has reared its ugly head once more. Strat-
egies of repression have become more sophisticated, and expanded into cyber-
space (Josua 2019). Even countries that can be classified as flawed democracies or 
 hybrid regimes according to the Democracy Index of The Economist Intelligence 
unit, such as Israel and Turkey respectively, have shown increased populist – if not 
 authoritarian – tendencies. On the other hand, new waves of protest have occurred 
in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq, countries that had remained on the sidelines 
during the initial Arab Spring. They are a reminder of the festering grievances in 
the region that can turn social protest into destabilisation of the currently prevalent 
political orders.
One immediate effect of the coronavirus crisis is that it has accomplished what 
authoritarian repression was often unable to: preventing public manifestations of 
discontent. In Algeria, protesters called off their marches for the first time in over a 
year. Another effect is the opportunities for increased cyber surveillance, which has 
been tightened since the Arab Spring. Even non-authoritarian governments in the 
region show worrying trends in that regard. Israel has expanded cyber surveillance 
without parliamentary approval, invoking emergency orders (Landau, Kubovich, 
and Breiner 2020). The coronavirus crisis has provided Netanyahu with a welcome 
opportunity to bypass parliament after three inconclusive elections and rule by 
 decree, while also shutting down the courts that were about to begin legal proceed-
ings against him on corruption charges. This prompted best-selling author Yuval 
Noah Harari to speak of a “coronavirus dictatorship.” Tunisia has also allowed gov-
ernment by decree according to Article 70 of its constitution. 
If a crisis is the hour of the executive, populist and authoritarian leaders did 
not, initially at least, step up to the plate. Rather they sought to belittle the coro-
navirus’s impact, promised magic cures, or blamed the situation on malign foreign 
influence. The MENA region has seen its own acts of denial, similar to the initial 
cover-up in China and the more recent doubts about the accuracy of its COVID-19 
statistics, or the waxing and waning of populists like Trump in the uS, Bolsonaro in 
Brazil, and López Obrador in Mexico that led to lagging reactions in their respective 
countries (Blofield, Hoffmann, and Llanos 2020). 
The Iranian regime initially covered up the outbreak, too. It was anxious to guar-
antee voter turnout for the parliamentary elections on 21 February, and feared the 
economic impact of a health crisis on a country that already suffers from  extensive 
uS sanctions. Later, at the end of March, Iranian supreme leader Khamenei  rejected 
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an uS offer for coronavirus-related aid, insinuating that the virus could have been 
developed by the uS government and went as far as alleging that it “is specifically 
built for Iran using the genetic data of Iranians, which they have obtained through 
different means” (Al Jazeera 2020). On 20 April, the country embarked on a  gradual 
relaxation of its lockdown, what prompted experts to warn that it came too early 
and could lead to a renewed acceleration of the outbreak. In Algeria, the govern-
ment summoned the French ambassador to protest a critical report on France24 
that questioned the effectiveness of Chinese aid – as it primarily benefitted a hospi-
tal reserved for the military elite (Asharq al Awsat 2020). 
As late as the end of March, president Erdogan still insisted that “Turkey is a 
country where production must continue and the cogs must keep turning under 
every circumstance and every condition.” Further, he only recommended a luke-
warm “voluntary quarantine,” prompting experts to speculate about a “hidden 
herd-immunity agenda” (Chotiner 2020). Official COVID-19 numbers are in doubt. 
Whistle-blowers and doctors who have been forthcoming about the magnitude of 
the problem have been intimidated, while pundits on state-controlled television 
were free to speculate that the superior quality of their genes made Turks more 
resistant to COVID-19.
Similar tactics could be observed in Egypt as well. When disease specialists 
from the university of Toronto doubted the official Egyptian statistics on  COVID-19 
cases, the Ministry of Health dismissed their higher estimates as “completely 
false” and claimed that it reported cases with “full transparency.” At the same time, 
 however, Egypt would expel a Guardian journalist who had reported on the issue, not 
unlike China – which revoked the press credentials of Wall Street Journal reporters 
on 19 February over a controversial op-ed. As in Turkey misinformation on state-con-
trolled media occurred, with pundits on television praising the health benefits of Egyp-
tian ful (a national dish made from fava beans) as a countermeasure to the disease.
Another source of disinformation can be religious circles, who have argued 
against curtailments of public religious services. Iranian ultra-conservatives have 
protested against the closure of the holy Shi‘i shrines in Qom, while the Moroccan 
government arrested the Salafist Abou Naim after he argued that the coronavirus-
induced closure of mosques was a pretext for a government strategy of fighting reli-
gion. Similar rumblings can be observed in Egyptian debates. In the ensuing Rama-
dan season – set to start in late April, with its iftar (breaking of the fast) gatherings 
an important source of food for the poor – such debates will likely gain in intensity. 
At the same time pressure will mount on regimes to lift lockdowns for economic 
reasons, or as a Tunisian construction worker put it: “We need food and solutions, 
we will die if this continues, at least the virus is curable but what can we do for the 
hunger?” (Barbarani 2020).
Whither MENA–EU Relations
The combination of reduced fiscal space, increased socio-economic grievances, 
and the poor handling of the coronavirus crisis will further undermine the already-
damaged legitimacy of MENA regimes – to which they will likely react with greater 
repression. Beside this domestic dimension there is an international one too, whose 
impact is yet harder to evaluate. The coronavirus crisis will certainly affect the in-
ternational system. It could result in national withdrawal, further weaken multilat-
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eralism, or it could strengthen the international order if states rally together out of 
a necessity to cooperate. In the worst-case scenario it could coalesce into a new Cold 
War scenario, albeit with the uS and China now constituting the bipolar powers. 
Like in Italy and Serbia, China is using coronavirus-related assistance to enhance 
its standing and soft-power appeal in the MENA too (Haddad-Fonda 2020). As 
part of this “mask diplomacy,” Chinese emergency deliveries have arrived to much 
 public fanfare in Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Sudan, and Iran.
In contrast the Eu has given the impression that it is either not willing or not 
able to help its own member states such as Italy and Spain, let alone the countries 
situated in its southern neighbourhood. Individual member states implemented 
export bans on medical equipment and kept purse strings tight when asked to de-
cide on emergency measures. As part of its stated intention to become a more geo-
political union, the Eu should advertise its existing assistance to close collabora-
tion partners such as Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Lebanon more prominently 
and should consider expanding it throughout its strategically important southern 
neighbourhood. This could include a post-pandemic vision of increased economic 
collaboration, as once the dust settles industrial value chains will likely become less 
globalised and more regional – not only for medical supplies. 
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